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STATES' RIGHTS, NATIONALISM, AND THE
SUPREME COURT
By GEORGE R. FARNUM, of the Boston Bar, FormerAssistant
Attorney General of the United States, Before the Twentieth
Century Association, Boston, Mass., October 24, 1936
The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice.
-Alexander Hamilton.
But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez-faire. It is
made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar
or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.
-- Justice Holmes.

N 1835, with the passing of Marshall, the great formative
era in the history of American constitutional law was
brought to an end. The philosophy of the founding
fathers, of whom Marshall was a contemporary and whose
traditions he shared, had been vindicated, the solidarity of the
Union firmly established, and the power and importance of
the Supreme Court impressively demonstrated. Whether one
can fully accept all the unstinted superlatives that his memory
has evoked or whether one feels at times the moderating doubt
once expressed by Holmes, "'Whether, after Hamilton and
the Constitution itself, Marshall's work proved more than a
strong intellect, a good style, personal ascendency in his court,
courage, justice, and the convictions of his party," no one can
deny his further assertion that, "Time has been on Marshall's
side, and the theory for which Hamilton argued, and he decided, and Webster spoke and Grant fought, and Lincoln died,
is now our cornerstone."
The country viewed with mixed emotions the appointment by Jackson of his one-time attorney general and unconfirmed appointee to the treasury portfolio, Roger B. Taney as
head of the court. Of curious pathos was the lament of Justice Story, who for more than two decades had been the lFidus
Achates of his departed chief, "I am the l.,st of the old race of
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judges. I stand their solitary representative with a pained
heart and subdued confidence." In this chastening role he was
destined to be cast for another decade to come, representing
the old order in the helpless position of dissent. Yet, when he
died, of him Taney wrote, "What a loss the court has sustained in the death of Judge Story! It is irreparable, utterly
irreparable in this generation; for there is nobody equal to
him."
In the ever-recurring cycles that appear to govern human
thought and control human destiny, it seems in retrospect that
the hour had perhaps come for some political reorientationfor some shift in constitutional emphasis, at least for the time
being. Taney found already on the court two Jackson appointees and with the next two years two more were added of
Democratic persuasion. The change in judicial outlook,
while not revolutionary, was nevertheless clearly discernible
from the first term after Taney's accession in the dramatic
battle of the bridges, the faith of the new dispensation was
proclaimed, though in point of fact the issue turned on the
narrow question as to whether in a legislative grant of the
privilege of maintaining a toll bridge over the historic waters
of the Charles river between Boston and Charlestown, the
grant should be construed as exclusive by implication. In
denying a monopolistic privilege in the absence of an express
declaration, the chief justice, speaking for the court, declared
that "A state ought never to be presumed to surrender this
power [to promote the general welfare through improved
channels of communication] because, like the taxing power,
the whole community have an interest in preserving it undiminished," adding, in words of portentous implication,
"While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded,
we must not forget that the community also have rights, and
that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depend on
their faithful preservation." Standing, as he asserted, "Upon
the old law," and defending the spirit of adjudication of earlier
times, Story vigorously dissented and asserted that, after the
first argument six years before, Marshall had been minded to
sustain the exclusiveness of the grant. Writing afterwards,
he lugubriously asserted that "There will not, I fear, ever
in our day, be any case in which a law of a state or of Congress will be declared unconstitutional, for the old constitu-
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tional doctrines are fast fading away, and a change has come
over the public mind from which I augur little good."
Taney died in 1864 and with him passed another accentuated epoch in constitutional history. "The central conception of the court affecting constitutional interpretation,"
during his leadership, as recently put by an acute student, Professor Corwin, "was that of the federal equilibrium; in other
words, the idea that the then-existing distribution of powers
between the states and the national government should be
regarded as something essentially fixed and unchangeable."
Unlike Marshall, who at least by implication denied its relevancy in deciding questions of federal power, for Taney the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was a significant
limitation upon it. In the end, the tendency to. stunt the development of national jurisdiction to meet the exigencies of
"an indefinite and expanding future," came into violent impact'with the agitation over slavery-an institution that could
only be adequately dealt with by national action-and the
Civil War which exacted for the very preservation of the
q4nion the exercise of the fullest measure of national power.
A new cycle had set in, and unlike Marshall, his was the fateescaped by Marshall-to live to see his influence wane and his
control of the court largely disappear. Had the minority
opinion of the court in the Prize cases, in which he concurred,
prevailed, the government would have found itself in a most
awkward situation in effectively maintaining the blockade
and at the same time preventing foreign recognition of the
Confederacy. Had the opportunity presented itself, on evidence of his own writings, he would have created a staggering
handicap to the successful prosecution of the war by declaring the Conscription Act unconstitutional. What his views
would have been on the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation had he been afforded a chance to express them judicially
can only be surmised, but there was undoubted uneasiness on
this score at the time. A certain fatality presided over the
destinies of his reputation for many years-darkened to a
large measure by the persisting odium of the Dred Scott decision and the recollection of his frequent collisions with military authorities during the rebellion. Charles Francis Adams,
no stranger to the harassing problems of the war, greeted the
news of his passing with the exclamation of relief, "So old
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Taney is at last dead," and Charles Sumner declared that,
"The name of Taney is to be hooted down the pages of his:tory. Judgment is beginning now; and an emancipated country will fasten upon him the stigma which he deserves.
He administered justice at last wickedly and degraded the
judiciary of the country and degraded the age."
Now that the passions of his day have spent their fury,
and his work can be appraised and his motives judged in sober
retrospect, the world concedes his memory a very fair measure
of justice. In fact, with a large body of public opinion at the
present time, his adherence to a static conception of the Constitution and his sponsorship of states' rights, have given his
accomplishments a peculiar contemporary interest.
Charles Francis Adams, predicting that the choice of
Taney's successor would fall to Salmon P. Chase, former
secretary of the treasury in the Lincoln cabinet, opined that,
if it did, "He will have a great future before him in the molding of our new constitutional law." Adams proved an accurate prophet, though Lincoln made the selection with some
misgivings about Chase's well-known political restlessness.
During the nine years allotted to the new chief justice, the
court was largely occupied with war litigation and with the
harassing troubles of reconstruction. The course of adjudication marked a strong running of the tide toward extreme
nationalism, dictated by the necessity of giving the government a strong and free hand in liquidating post-war problems
and made possible by the ascendency of the Lincoln appointees,
of which Chase was the fifth. In the middle of the period,
however, in the celebrated Milligan case, the court vindicated
the great democratic principle that since "The Constitution
of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and in peace, at all times, and under all circumstances,"
it follows that its prescriptions could not "be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government" and that "Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in thg
proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." It
should be furthermore noted in passing that the closing of the
period marked a perceptible ebbing of the tide from the high
water mark of nationalistic adjudication.
In 1874 President Grant selected Morrison R. Waite to
fill the vacancy caused by the death of Chase-an appointment
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which, according to Charles Warren, "was greeted with a
sense of relief but with no enthusiasm." During the fourteen
years of Waite's services, however, he conducted himself, in
the words of some competent critic, "to the satisfaction of the
bar and of the public."
The constitutional history of these
years, as well in fact of the entire period since the close of the
reconstruction
is largely what has been summarized as
"the history of era,
the adaptation of constitutional principles to
rapidly changing economic and social conditions." The fourteen years of Waite's incumbency may be roughly divided into
two periods, during the first of which, for the most part, the
recessive tendency noted at the close of his predecessor's service continued, with the court showing a pronounced disposition to maintain state authority. During the latter part of
his term, however, another change in tendency set in, with a
swing back toward a more nationalistic outlook, one which
was destined to increase for some time to come. Among thg
reasons that may have contributed to the change, two may be
singled out for mention. New appointments to the court had
affected the balance of opinion. Additionally, the transformation in American life due to the momentum of the Industrial Revolution and the impetus added to the exploitation
of the seemingly limitless natural resources of the country consequent on the release of the national energies previously absorbed in war and the political problems of its immediate
aftermath were making themselves felt. The growing sense
of national unity demanded a greater concentration of power
in the federal government, necessarily at the expense of state
sovereignty.
In 1888 Waite died and was succeeded by Melville
Weston Fuller, whose service extended to 1910. He was
in turn replaced by Edward Douglass White, who presided
until 1921. Contemporary fundamental conditions that
reacted on the spirit and character of the work of the court can
only be briefly summarized. Added to the phenomenal development of its continental affairs, the nation vastly extended
its international interests, assuming in this connection the
grave responsibilities of an imperialistic role. Together with
the strenuous and sustained efforts to deal both nationally and
locally with baffling economic and social problems, there was
imposed upon the court a large and burdensome program for
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Interstate commerce regulation,
constructive adjudication.
anti-trust legislation, and federal injunctions were to play an
important part in the decisions. To such an extent was the
growing power of the national government fostered that at the
very end of the period the late James M. Beck noted that,
"The insistence upon the reserved rights of the states has
become little more than a political platitude," adding, "The
American people think nationally and not locally, as they once
Midway in the
thought locally and rarely nationally."
period, however, the court itself put the situation with greater
restraint. "Our dual form of government has its perplexities
.. but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and
the powers reserved in the states and those conferred on the
nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral." The court, responsive to the exigencies of change,
had ushered in an era that would have assuaged the despair of
Story, expressed a century before, though just before its close
a divided court in the child labor case, served notice that constitutional barriers still stood against the growing pressure of
nationalism.
The terms of the court presided over by William Howard
Taft-who was appointed in 1921-marked no pronounced
change in fundamental attitude. At its beginning the second
child labor law, again by a divided court, was consigned to the
same fate as its predecessor. The judges were called upon to
deal with perplexing questions growing out of the prohibition
amendment and the Volstead Act. These decisions were
marked by two strong tendencies, first to uphold the arm of
the government in the widest fashion in what was to prove
a futile and sorry effort to deal with the liquor question by
national authority, and secondly to protect the constitutional
guarantees of individual rights and immunities from the
action of enforcement personnel. Throughout the period and
into that of the present chief justice, Charles Evans Hughes,
who succeeded Taft in 1930, the court continued on the whole
to adapt its views to the advancing spirit of nationalism and
the receding prestige of state authority.
With the advent of the New Deal and the efforts to deal
with the economic breakdown and its tragic consequences to
the welfare and morale of the country, through congressional
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legislation, these old issues of states' rights and national power
have again become major political issues, complicated by
alignment of curious interest from an historical point of view.
During the brief years since Roosevelt took office, the court
has been repeatedly called upon to pass on questions of the
greatest complexity and to adapt the Constitution to emergency conditions without impairing its essential integrity.
Never before-in so short a period-have so many laws passed
by Congress fallen before judicial scrutiny. For the most part
the court has been sharply divided, and rarely have dissenting
views been more vigorously expressed. The repercussion on
a public-unusually susceptible by reason of unprecedented
conditions and agitated by bitter partisan feelings and debate
-has been great. The result has been to push the court into
the center of the spotlight and to subject its work to the widest
public discussions, and the political campaign has in no wise
mitigated this situation.
No such compressed treatment of the history of the court
and the vicissitudes of constitutional adjudication as is here
ventured can present more than a very rough and sketchy
approximation to high lights and major trends. Minor divagation must be completely ignored. It will be seen, however,
that the work of interpreting constitutional prescriptions,
adapting them to the rapid changes in the fundamentals of
American life, and adjusting the ever-competing claims of state
authority and national power, has been constantly and profoundly influenced by the dominant conceptions of economic
policy, political philosophy, and social outlook of the times
and of the individuals composing a continuously changing
judicial personnel. Years ago, Lord Justice Mellish hazarded
the opinion that "the whole of the Rules of Equity and ninetenths of the Rules of the Common Law have in fact been
made by judges," though the scope of such legislation has
been largely disguised by the slowness of the process of judicial accretion through trial and error-the laborious process
"in pricking out a line in successive cases" as Chief Justice Taft
once called it-and by resort to the convention that the judges
only expound and apply the law as they actually find it. No
court, in no field, however, has played a more decisive legislative role than that of the United States Supreme Court in
constitutional decision. From this dilemma there is no pos-
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sible escape under the American system, and in the course of
the years the decisions of the court have necessarily reflected the
influence of those vast changes that years have wrought in the
character of American civilization. It has also reflected the
influence of the impact of society with alternating war and
peace, with the recurrent cycles of prosperity and depression
and with the vagaries of public opinion. On the whole, it can
be asserted that, viewed over the years, the movement of adjudication in the court has been one of cautious and at times
painful advance--checked intermittently by recoil and recession-but on the whole a normal reaction of an institution
recruited from members of a profession which, as De Tocqueville long ago observed, "are conservative as a class" and designed to function in harmony with the spirit of what has
been styled "the strange conservatism of a progressive people."
Not infrequently the court has been sharply divided as
divergent political, economic, and social views battled for
mastery, and there have seldom been long periods in which
some pronouncement of the court has not called forth choruses
of sharp public dissent and hostile criticism. Thus it must
ever be. Society is not static and the judicial process involved
in constitutional construction is implicated in its most creative
and dynamic role. In its fundamental aspects such criticism
is not to be entirely deprecated. There is no surer sign of the
fatal decay of thought that Emerson diagnosed than apathy
on the part of the people to the functioning of their major
political institutions. In fact, not infrequently dissenting
members of the court itself have expressed serious misgivings
as to the character and effect of particular decisions--such as
were voiced so long ago by Story. Time, however, has largely
deflated these misgivings as it has always tempered public opinion. In the end, sensible students of American government
have been persuaded that, on the whole, the court has amply
fulfilled the hope of those who established it as a basic factor
in American democracy, and has earned the respect and confidence of those who continue to look to it to perform the difficult task of preserving, on the one hand, the essential elements
of the Constitution while avoiding, on the other, any undue
frustration of the orderly evolution of human affairs toward a
better and happier social goal with the passing years and growing public enlightenment.

